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ABSTRACT
Background and Review of Na tional Labor Relations Board am
Court Decisions in the Area of Managements
Prerogatives - The Darlington
and General Cases
by
Charles 1-1, Bullen, Jr,
Utah State University, 1967
Major Professor: E. B. Murray
Department : Economics
The effects of the Darlington case on managements prerogatives
was that i t spelled out what a multi-plant em}:lloter ii!Ust do in the
area of plant closure to avoid violating the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 .

There was al so good evidence brought forth to show that

management is now bargaining plant closures with union.

Thus the

conclusion was made that in the area multi-plant employers had lost
some power due to the Darlington Case,
The General Case is presently in the Courts and until a final
court decision is made it is hard to say what effect it will have on
managements prerogatives,

(76 pages)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement on Management's Preroga tives
In recent years the National labor Relations Board and the Federal

Courts have made decisions in the area of managements' right to management.

These decisions have brought forth some new interpretations of

the National labor Relations Act of 1935, as amended, concerning management's prerogatives in dealing with organized labor.
Nature of Problem
As a result of these deci sions , a great deal of public controversy
has persisted concerning their intent.

One side states that management

ha s misused its power and that the National labor Relations Board is
right in curbing management' s misused power.

The other side believes

that the National labor -Relations Board has made rulings in areas where
it ha s no business, thereby diminishing management's prerogatives to
manage .
Purpo se of the Study
The purpose of this investigation will be to ans wer the following
questions :
First, what have the National labor Relations Board and Federal
Courts really said in their respective decisions in the areas of plant
closure and overall bargaining procedures (Boulwarism) 7

2

Second, have t hese decisions weakened mana gement's prerogatives in
deali ng with organized labor , and if so, t o what extent?
Third, what i s t he controversy centered around ?
Fourth, to gi ve addi t i onal i nsi ghts into the historical background of
management 1 s prerogati ves .
Hethod of Investigation
This inves tigation will fi r s t look at the history of the labor
movement, and then review the laws that make up the rules by which labor
and management must abi de.

It l<.lll also examine the decisions of the

Federal Courts and the National Labor Relations Board to see exactly
wlw. t ha s

l:n~en

stated in reoent oontrove:rs;l.al

deci~:l.ons.

This analysis

of the decisions i s made to point out the more relevant facts that have
led to the contrasting views and will be carried out by library-research
s tudy.

An analysis will also be made of both sides of the controversies

to point out t he area s of contention .

From these investigations, an

attempt will be made to show where the Nati onal Labor Relations Board
a nd the courts have plac ed management' s prerogatives .
Limitations of the Study
If the above pr ocedures were f ollowed in covering all areas of recent

controversy ov er decisions concerning labor law, the limited time given
to write this paper would not be sufficient.

Thus, two area s of major

controversy have been chosen; they are plant closing, and a company's
overall approach to bargaining.
is the key i n a series of cases.
case ha s been chosen.

In the former area the Darlington case
In the latter the General Electric

J
Such important area s of controversy a s the subcontracting of wor k ,
as set forth in the Fiberboard cas e; and the ability of labor-management
to enforce contracts, as set forth i n both the Westinghouse ca se and the
Lincoln Mills case, will not be discussed in this paper even though they
are of importance.
It should also be stated that although there is considerable a ttention
given to the basic statutes that concern themselves with labor relations,
the statut es are much more involved and no attempt is made to give a
complete analysis of them.

There are also several statutes that in one

way or another pertain to labor, but only those that concern labor-management relations are taken into consideration in the paper.

CHAPTER II
HISTORY
A history of managements prerogatives in labor negotiation could

start as far back as 1200 B. C. and perhaps farther, but one of the most
widely read early labor dispute s took place in Egypt in about 1200 B. C.
and a written account i s in the King James Bible. 1

This dispute arose

out of the Pharaoh ' s command t hat the Israelites be given no more straw
to make brick; that they should go out and get the straw and not have it
given to them, but by the same token brick productions were to remain the
same.

Thus, the Israel1tes were to

ta~e

over

anothe~

step in the

duction of brick and k&ep the quantity at the same l&vel.

pro~

At this the

leader of the Israelites went to t he Pharaoh's taskmasters and said the
work was too much.

For this they were beaten and could have been killed.

One can easily see that in this l abor dispute management had the upper
hand.

The main prerogative in this case, as in most disagreements

between ma s ter and slave, was how harsh the punishment should be.

Perhaps

the reason why more slaves were not killed was that it was hard to get
good slaves .

Slavery i s perhaps the crudest form of labor-management relations
because, as stated above, the sl ave bad little or no say in the way his
life was to be conducted.

Slavery started in very early times, and it is

1 The Holy Bible: (King James Version) {Salt Lake City, Utah:
Deseret Book Company, 1954), p. 80 .

The
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also interes ting to note tha t in ancient civiliza tion slaves were rarely
used i n the fields .

They lived i n town and were used for the mai n part

as domestic servants and artisans.2
through hard work and some did .

Slaves could gain their freedom

Slavery continued from these early times

through to the period of the Roman Empire, at which time it all but died
out,
Slavery did not begin again on any great scale until 1441 when the
Portuguese began bringing back slaves from Africa to work in the fields
of the homel and. J

This slavery continued in Europe and spread to the

Ameri can colonies of England in 161 9 when twenty Negroes were sold to
Jamestown colonists . 4 Slaves did not appear in any great number in this
country until the 1680•s and the number continued to grow for the next
one hundred and forty years ,

By 1870 the Negroes in this country were

estimated at 460,000 or about 20 per cent of the total population.5

In

1815 the slave trade became illegal in Europe at the Congress of Vienna ,
and slavery wa s slowly done away with in European colonies thereafter.
The slavery in this country remained until 1864.

Slaves in the

United States were the property of the owner and could be bought and
sold at will and put to whatever use the mas ter saw fit.

This is a far

cry from the r ights that labor has today.
2Ches t er G. Starr, Charles E. Nowell, Bryce Lyon, Raymond P. Stearns,
and Theodore S. Hamerow, A History of the World (Chicago, Illinois : Rand
McNally and Company, 1960), p. 28 .
J shepard Bancroft Clough and Charles Wodsey Cole , Economic History of
Europe (Boston, Massachusetts : D. C, Heath and Company, 1932), p, 1o7.
4Arthur Cecil Bining and Thomas C. Cochran, The Rise of American
Economic Life (New York, New York: Charles Scribrier's Sons, 1964),
pp. 65-66.
5Ibid., p. 29 .
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Lords and Serfs
The next form of labor management relations to come along after
slavery was the serf-lord relationship.

The serf was not much better

off than a slave for he wa s tied to the land.

Serfs did have some rights,

and many s erfs owned land, but the greatest part of the land belonged to
the lord of the manor.

The serf would do so much work for the lord, and

in turn the lord would provide the serf with protection and use of some
of his land.

This type of relati onship between labor and management

existed from about .500 A. D. to 1.500 A. D. in most of Europe.
until the mid 1800's in parts of Germany.

It lasted

Toward the end of the period,

say from 1 )00 A. D. on, the Feudal System began to break down, and the
growth of the towns became more i ntensive.

The break up of the Feudal

System was caused by many things, perhaps the most important were :
econo~.

1.

The r ise of money

2.

An increase in trade and market.

).

The rise of nation and state to provide protection and justice. 6

Another event that took place later was the enclosure movement that also
helped bring an end to feudalism.
With the end of the Feudal System, free labor began to appear.

This

free labor moved to the cities and went to work many times in the manufacturing of goods.

A great deal of the manufacturing at this time was done

by the Guilds, which brings up the next form of labor management relations,
the Master , Journeyman, and Apprentice,

6c1ough and Ccle, ££· ~ ·, p. 29.
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The Guilds
The Guilds, as they pr ogressed through their history, set up the
ba sis from which the modern arrangements of labor and management have
evolved.

A guild was set up as early as 1099 in Worms; it was a fisher-

mans guild, and in 1106 the cordwainers (shoemakers) of Wurzburg set up
a craft guild.?
The craft guilds were set up to control production (both quality
and quantity), hours, wages, prices, rules, and apprenticeship regulations.
The gradation within the guild were apprentice, journeyman, master; and
the elected leaders of the guild were called wardens.

For a boy to become

an apprentice, his family would sign a written contract indenturing their
@1~ht

to

glgv~n

ygar gld

~gn

to

~ ~~tQr ,

Appr@nt i ceqh1p

to twelve years, depending on the trade to be learned.
would live with the master and his family.

tQo~

from two

The apprentice

The master would teach the

apprentice the trade, and i n turn, the apprentice would work for the
master.
When the time of a pprenticeship was over, the apprentice became a
journeyman and wa s fr ee to go seek work in any master's shop where he
could find a job.

The journeyman was free to change his employer any

time he pleased , but he wa s required to give notice of his quiting.

The

journeyman was free to move about a t will and was free to marry if he had
saved enough money to support a wife and family.
In the early years of the guilds, it was easy for a journeyman to

become a master; but as t ime went on, it became progressively harder.
This occurred because as the guilds got stronger , the masters wanted to
7~ .• p.

44.
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keep the profit of the trade by keeping the wages low.

With low wages

and high dues, necessary to become a master, the journeyman began to
form groups to rai se wages and to get better working conditi ons .

These

organizations were often under the guise of a religious organization, but
at this time (1500) the masters were powerful enough to get laws against
strikes and combina tions of workers.
This can be said to be the start of what was to become the modern
factory system, because as the guild masters became more powerful they
took on the role of management and were no longer actual practicing
workers of the trade,

The guilds slowly changed and many of them became

corporations, with what used to be the master now as the employer and
owner.

The journeyman now became the employee of the company.

This

break up of the guilds began about 1600 and continued until about 1750.
By this time the remaining guilds had little power, and the change from
a guild system to capitalism had taken place,
The groups of journeymen that joined together to fight the oppression of the powerful masters were perhaps the first real start of labor
unions even though a far cry from what unions are today.
As early as 1400 a change had taken place in the relationship between
labor and management in that the masters had to rely on the law to bring
about their ends , no longer could a worker be beaten or killed by his
master.

Thus it can be said that as early as the fourteenth century

labor law was being practiced .
As noted above, strikes were illegal as were the organizations
themselves,

Even though the laws favored the masters, there was still

the rule of law, and the law itself became more and more powerful as
time went on.
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'The Rise of Organized Labor
The slave trade and the guilds died out at about the same time and
labor moved into its modern era.

Labor organizations were still illegal,

In 1721 in the cas e of .The King!!· Journeymen-Taylors of Cambridge, the
English courts ruled that the journeymen taylors were involved in a
criminal conspiracy to raise their wage. 8

In 1809 a similar case took

place in the United States, the People of the State of New York !!• James
Melvin , or more commonly known as the Cordwainers

~·

The basic point

of this was that a combination of workers was unlawful,9
Even with the English case as background, craft unions began to
appear in the United States, the more important being the carpenters ( 1791 )
and the Cordwainer ( 1794) in Philadelphia. 10

By 1791 the printers and by

1795 the tailors of Baltimore were organized, and by 1803 the New York
Society of Journeymen Shipwrights was formed to mention just a few.
These were first considered by the public as dangerous and unpatriotic,
finding very little i f any public support.
These early unions called several strikes,

The most important of

which was the last of a series of strikes called by The Society of Master
Cordwainers of the city of Philadelphia in 1805.

Out of this strike came

the above mentioned Cordwainer Case which declared that labor unions were
an unlawful conspiracy,

This case set a precedent that unions had to

work and organize under for years to come,

The Unions movement continued

in this country even though i t was hard for them to exist ,
8stephen J, Mueller and A. Howard ~ers, Labor Law and Legislation
(Chicago, Illinois : South-Western Publishing Company, 1962), p. 10,
9Ibid ,. p, 29.
10Bining and Cochran , .!!!!· cit., pp. 249-250.
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Management was able to maintain its almost absolute rule of labor
unions until 1842 then, in that year , the Supreme Court of the s tate of
Massachusetts ruled in the famou s

Commonwea lth~·

Hunt case tha t:

(1) trade unions were not a criminal conspiracy and, therefore, lawful;

( 2) that to strike for a closed shop was not unlawful; and (3) that the
unio n as a whole wa s not responsi ble for unlawful acts committed by its
members.

This decision together with laws passed in several states

during the following few years gave the unions a great push forward.
Between 1842 and 186o labor unions grew, and many national unions
were formed, so that by 1860 there were twenty-six national trade union
in the United States. 11

A national union is a union made up of several

local unions of the same trade ,

An example would be the shoell!akers from

several cities (local) banding together to form one nation wide union or
national union.

This number continued to grow until by 1866 there were

thirty-two national trade unions. 12
During the period from the end of the War Between the States to
about 1900, labor made definite gains .

During this period an at tempt

was made to form a single large union to represent all labor regardless
of trade .

This was first tried by William H. Sylvis in 1866 when he

organized The National Labor Union, but it failed.

'!hen in 1869 the

Knights of Labor was formed and rose to considerable strength under
the leadership of Uriah S. Stevens and T. V. Powerly.

The Knights of

Labor reached its greatest s trength in 1886 and thereafter declined,
The Knights did carry out some successful strikes and did organize
11 Ibid., p. 253.

12MuellerandM;yers, 2£· cit., p. 466.

11
many workers .
In 1886 The American Feder a t i on of Labor was founded by Samuel

Gompers .

This loo s ely knit organization of craft-unions was the organi-

zation that came to s tay.

The American Federation of Labor was set under

Gompers in such a way that it wa s an exponent of laissez faire.

Gompers

and the A. F. of L. oppo s ed government intervention in labor relations.
Gompers believed that labor and management should be allowed to fight
it out between themselves to see who would win.
ment should be used to keep law and order.

He believed the govern-

This "bread and butter" type

of unionism caught on and stayed, because i t was most compatible with
the American way of life.
During this same period , management gave up ground mainly in the
areas of hours of work , child labor, and improved safety conditions.
Management could no longer make a man or child work long hours (84 hours
per week) under unsafe conditions without breaking the law, but it must
be noted that poor conditions did s till exist in 1900.

By 1900 manage-

ment's God given right to manage as management saw fit was beginning to
be questioned.

Management's prerogative as to what they paid, who worked,

and how long they worked were now no longer solely up to management.
Labor 1900-1930
Labor still had a long way to go in 1900 to reach its present
statis.

The period of time from 1900 to the present has been marked

by the passage of much labor legislation and many court decisions

to

interpret these laws.
One of the laws that came for review before the Supreme Court of
the United States was a Utah law that limited underground lllin1ng to an

12
eight hour work day. 13
Holden :!:· Hardy case .

The court upheld this law in a decision i n the
This was one of t he few time s the court sided

with labor around the turn of the century, 1898.

Sanford Cohen, a noted

labor writer, ha s called the period from 1880 to 1930 "Judicial
Conservatism, "14 The courts handed down decisions both on legislation
and various tactics used by unions in labor disputes.

'!his paper will

deal primaril y with the cases that were used to interpret the laws .
The first law of the period to come under the eye of the courts was
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act ,

The first case to see if labor wa s to be

nder the anti-trust law was the Loewe !· Lawlor case better known as the
~

Hatters case,

This case came before the Supreme Court of the

United States in 1908 . 15 In this case the court ruled that the latter
had engaged in a secondary boycott and that this s econdary boycott affected
interstate commerce,
of trade ,

Thus the combination (the Hatters) was in restraint

The union then had to pay the company triple damages,

'!his

put labor unions under the control of the anti-trust law ,
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act, which contained two sections,
6 and 20, that were designed to remove labor from the anti-trust laws ,
Section 6 said in part, "the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or an article of commerce, n16 thus, it was not under the anti-trust laws,
Section 20 removed labor di sputes from the area where a court injunction
1JBining and Cochran , ££· cit. , p. 466,
14Sanford Cohen, Labor Law (Columbus, Ohio:
Book , Inc. , 1964), p. 1o8.

Charles E. Merrill

1.5)jerbert G. Heneman , Jr. and Dale Yoder, Labor Economics
(Cincinnati , Ohio : South-Western Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 282-28).
16u.

s. ,

Clayton Act, Sec. 6.

13
could be issued.

At the time this law was passed, it wa s held by l abor

l eaders as the greatest step forward in labor history.

Had this act stood

the test of the courts, it would have cut into management's preroga tives
in its dealings with the labor to a very great extent, but in 1921 in a
6-J decis ion the Supreme Court of the United States handed down the
decision i n the Duplex!· Deering case.17
purposes, voided sections 6 and 20.

This decision, for all practical

The dis sent was very sharp in this

case with Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Clarke in the dissent.

It is

interesting to note that in many of the labor decisions i n the early part
of this century Holmes and Brandeis dissented, but as time has pas sed the
law ha s changed, and their dissents are closer. to the law today than the
majority opinions to whi ch they dissented .
With the fall of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, ma.nagement
could again obtain i njunctions in labor dis putes.

Management still did

not have to recognize unions, and management could discriminate against
worker s for being members of a labor union.
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court said that the "Yellow Dog "

Contract was lawful in the Hitchman Coal and Co ke Co.

~·

Mitchell .

In

1927 the United States Supreme Court backed up the Duplex!· Deering
decision with the decision in the

~

Cut Stone Company !· Journeyman

Stone Cutters' Association in which the court still put unions under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
With the above decision and three others,
~

!· Kansas,

and~!·

~

! • United States,

Corrigan, the United States Supreme

Court did a good job of cutting down most all state and federal laws that
tried to get labor unions either reorganized or out from under the anti17cohen, 2E· cit., pp. 120-130.

14
trust laws.

Up until the 1930's management had pretty much its own way

mainly because of the general laissez-faire attitude of both the general
public and the courts, but things began to change in the 1930's.
1930 to the Present
This period is when labor grew to prominence .

During this period

five major federal labor law acts have been passed with which this paper
i s concerned.

They are:

The Railway labor Act of 1926, The Norris-

laGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, The National Relations labor Act of 1935
(The Wanger Act), labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act), and the labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(landrum.-Griffin Act).
The Railway labor Act of 1926, concerns itself only with those
people working on interstate railroads.

Even though this act was pa s sed

in 1926, i t is more in the spirit of the 19JO's than of the previous
period.

That is why it is included in this section.

wa s to enc ourage bargaining with the government.
to include:

Its main purpose

In 1934 it was amended

first, that an employer could not coerce employees to join

one union over another, second, that a company could not give funds to
help any labor union, third, it outlawed the "Yellow Dog" Contract ,
fourth , it outlawed as terms of employment that the worker must join a
union.

This law was the forerunner of the National labor Relations Act

of 1935.
The Norris-laGuardia Anti-Injunction Act passed congress in 19)2.
The main purpose of this act was to spell out to the courts what constitutes a labor dispute, under what conditions an injunction could be used,
and that "Yellow Dog" Contracts were not enforceable in court.

The act

15
also declared t hat congress went on record as saying that a worker wa s
free to join or not to join any labo r organi zation of his choos ing.
The i ssuance of i n junctions i n labor di sputes was not made illegal
in the act, but a definate se t of rules wa s put forth under which one
could be issued ,

The Act basically s tated that injunc ti ons could be

issued when:
(1) Unlawful acts are threatened and will be committed
unles s res trained, or unlawful acts are being committed
and will continue unless restrained; ( 2) Substantial and
irreparable damage to the complainants pr operty will
follow; (3) Greater injury will be i nflicted upon the
complainant by denial or r el ief than will be inflicted
upon the defendants by the granting of r elief; (4) The
complainant ha s no other adequate remedy at law; (5)
The public officer charged with protecting complainant'fs
property are unable or unwilling to furni sh protection .
This act partly destroyed one of management's strongest weapons in fighting strikes for before this time management could .get an injunction for
just about any reason.

This act did not come under the eye of the courts

until 1937. and by that time the judicial tide had turned in favor of

\

labor .
The Na tional Labor Relations Ac t of 1935 is the act around which
todays labor relations are centered.
major areas.
management.

The act can be broken into three

First , it gave t he employees rights in their relati ons with
In section 7 the act s tates :

"Employees shall have the right

to self-organizations, to form , join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and

to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
18 Ibid • • p. 143 .
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that s uch right may be affected by an agreement requiring membershi p
in a l abor organi zation a s a condi tion of employment. "
Section 8 al so gives the employee certain rights .
are listed as five unfair l abor practices.

These rights

They are that an employer

cannot (1) interfere with, res train or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7, (2) dominate or interfere with the
formation or administra tion of any labor organization or contributes
f i nancial or other support to i t , (J ) discriminate in regard to hire, or
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membershi p in any labor organization, (4) to discharge or
otherwise discriminate agains t an employee because he has filed charges
or given testimony under thi s Act , (5) refuse to bargain Qolleotively
with the repre sentat ives of his employees.19
The National Labor Relati ons Board is responsible for the administration of the Act and the unfai r l abor practice come under their ajudication.
Certain of thes e will be looked at more clo sely later in thi s paper.
The second part of the NLRA sets up the procedures by which a union
becomes a bargaining agent f or a certain group of workers.

This part of

the act also sets up the National Labor Relations Board and charged it
with carrying out the procedures f or representation.
had three members but now i t has five.

The board originally

They are appointed by the

President with the advice and consent of the United States Senate.
The third part of the act impowered the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to hear wifair labor practice cases and issue cease and
desist orders when they found an employer guilty of an unfair labor
19u. S. , National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Section 8(A).
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practice.

The NLRB was given no direct power to enforce their cease and

desist orders, but instead they mus t go to the United States Circuit Courts
to get their orders enforced.
One can see that if this ac t were held to be constitutional, management would lose a great deal of power in dealing with labor.
the courts was not long in coming .
Corporation!·

National~

The test in

The case was Jones and Laughlin Steel

Relations Board.

In 1937 in the Jones and Laughlin case, the NLRA was to see i f it

could s tand the test of the Supreme Court.

It must be stated that at

this time in history the Court was under much pressure from both sides.
President Roosevelt was putting pressure on the Court by stating that
he wanted a different type of court set-up, and with a large majority of
the voters having put him back i n the White House in 1936, the Court had
reason to think about his reque s t.

On the other hand was the fact that

nearly sixty of the nation' s most prominent attorneys had signed a statement to the effect that they believed that the NLRA was unconstitutiona1. 20 -./
Because of these rea sons, plus the burden of past precedents--many of
them very recent--the Court found itself sharply divided.
The case started when the Jones and laughlin Steel Corporation
fired ten members of the Beaver Valley Lodge No. 200 of the Amalgamated
Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers of America for union activity.
Thus, the company engaged in an unfair labor practice, 21

This activity

is illegal under Section 8(a)1 which states that it is not legal "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
20 cohen, ~· cit.,pp. 151-152.
21
1tleller and JVers, ~· cit., p. 336.
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r ights guaranteed i n Section 7. n 22

Section 7 basically states that

wor kers can join a l abor organi zati on of their own choosing.

This

activity of the company is also in violation of Section 8(a) 3 which
states that "discrimination i n r egard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any l a bor organization" 23 is an unfair labor practice,
The case came to the Court as a result of the National Labor
Relations Board's (NLRB) s tatement that the above parts of Section 8
had been violated,

The Circuit Court denied enforcement of the NLRB's

orders, and that there had been subsequent denial of certiorari by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, thus the NLRB appealed to the Supreme Court,
an~

tho Supreme Court did grant certiorari.
The Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation argued that the NLRA was

an act that was pass ed under the commerce regulating powers of the
Constitution and that regulation of labor relations was not interstate
commerce,

The Company also sta t ed in its behalf that the ten workers

in que stion were not under the juri sdiction of the NLRA because they
were involved in production, and production is not subject to regulation
by the federal government,

In furthering its argument, the Company went

on to state that it believed the NLRA to be unconstitutional under Article
III, Section 2, and the Fifth and Seventh Amendments of the Constitution. 24
Article III, Section 2, basically states the areas in which the federal
government has power.

The Company argued that the federal government had

no power to legislate ·in the area under consideration,
22Ibid , , pp. 339-34o.
23Ibid,
24Cohen, !!.E• cit, , p, 1,54,
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The Fifth Amendment is the amendment containing the "due process
claus e. "

The Company a r gued tha t they ware deprived of due process of

l aw by the NLRA.
The Company al so claimed that they had bean deprived of the rights
held under the Seventh Amendment, because in the National Labor Relation
Board's ruling on the cas e they told the Company to give the workers in
question back pay, and this bac k-pay order was given without a trial by
jury.

At no time did the Company say that they had not discriminated
against the workers for union activities.

The decision handed down by

Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes was a sweeping victory for the NLRB.
The decision wa s handed down on April 12, 1937,
decision written by Chief Justice Hughes,

It was a 5-4

In the decision, Chief Justice

Hughes sat down four major poi nts:
First, the NLRA was i n r egulation of commerce,

Although the NLRA

was not directly in regulation of commerce, the Constitution gives the
Congress the power to l egisl ate in area s that are "affecting commerce, u25
This part of the decision gives the Act a very wide scope,
Second, the Court ruled that the Company had committed unfair labor
practices against the ten worker s and that the Company must comply with
the NLRB ruling, including the back-pay regulation. 26
Third, the Court ruled that the workers were involved in interstate
commerce even though they were involved in production because the pro-

25Muellar and MYers , 2£· cit., p, JJ9.
26class Notes from Economics 125, November 6, 1964, Utah State
University, Logan, Utah (in possession of the writer),
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duction process is involved in the "stream of commerce . n 27
Fourth, t he NLRA was not uncons titutional under any of the amendments
of the Consti t ution.
It is this decision that se t down the constitutionality of the
basic labor l aw that is stil l in effect today.
With the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act
proven, plus several other court cases that removed the unions from the
jurisdiction of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, management's power went
steadily down hill for twelve years .
Between the National Labor Relations Act and the other court cases,
management los t the power to not recognize unions, the power of laying
off a union worker for the reason of being in a union, the power to have
company supported unions, and the power to not bargain with unions.

The

court also broadened its power by moving into the area of manufacturing
by saying it wa s interstate commerce.

This brought a great number of

workers under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.

They

heretofore had not been considered under the provision of the Act.
The reason f or this was that World War II had just ended and this
was the first year unions could strike.

In 1946, public opinion was

against organized labor because of the many strikes which had taken
place that year, 28 One of the major strikes which took place in 1946
was in the coal mining industry.

This strike helped turn the general

public against organi zed labor, because it was called in the middle of
the winter and many pe ople went cold.

There were also strikes in other

27MUeller and MYers, 2E· cit., p. J41.
28Herbert R. Northrup and Gordon F. Bloom, Government and Labor:
The Role of Government in Union-Management Relations (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin , Inc., 1963), pp. 67-70 .
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vital industries the same year , such as a police strike in Bos ton,
When the people went to the polls in 1946, they made i t quite clear
that they wanted the power of organiz ed labor decreased,

A Republican

Congress was sent to Wa shington i n 1947, and on June 23 , 1947, it passed
the Taft-Hartley Act over the veto of President Truman .
The act wa s an amendment and an addition to the National. Labor
Relations Act of 1935 .

The Taft-Hartley Act as it is best known is

formally called the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
has three important parts,

This Act

The first part is section 8(b) .

Section B(b) was placed in the Taft-Hartley Act to offset the five
unfair labor practices tha t employers were prevented from perpetrating
against unions by provisions of the Wagner Act,
Provisions of Section 8(b)
There are seven unfair labor practices in section B(b),
only six i n the original Taf t-Hartley Act,

There were

The seventh was added in 1959.

Section 8(b)1 makes it an unfair labor practice to restrain or coerce
employees in the exercis e of the right to bargain collec tively through
a union of the employees' own choosing. 29
stop the strong-arm tactics of unions,

Section 8 (b)1 was set up to

The union would bring in people

to hel p i n their organizational campaigns, and these helpers would intimidate worker s into voting for the union.

This intimidation is the reason

for Section 8 (b)1 ,
Section 8(b)2 ma kes it illegal to coerce an employer into discriminating against employees to make these employees enter into a union
security agreement unless the union has a security contract that is legal

29ill!!·' p. 88.
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under the Act. 3°

Under thi s section of the Act, a closed sho p is an

illegal union security contract.

If a union can get a union sho p ag ree-

ment with an employer , the new worker does not have to join the union
until JO days after his hi r i ng.

This JO days wa s decreased to 7 days

in the constructi on industry by the Landrum-Griffin Act.

Section 8(b) 2

als o contains the provisions governing the requirements for union shop
agreements which are too lengthy to be covered in this report.
It is an unfair labor prac t i ce on the part of a union if the union
refuses to bargain collectively with an employer under Section 8{b) J ,
This section was set up to stop a union from coming to the bargaining
table wi th "take it or leave it" proposals) 1

The words "bargain in

good faith" a ppear in this Section , and the meaning of this phrase bas
been the key to many court decisions.

This also ties in very closely

with section 8{d) ,
Section 8(d) states "to ba r gain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
res pect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
. . , but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession,"

This point shall come

under more consideration later in thi s paper.32
Section 8(b)4 deals with illegal strikes and boycotts.
secondary boycotts as a means for unions to gain their ends,

It outlaws
It also

JOMueller and Myers, 2£· cit., p. 462.
31 Northrup arrl EI.oom, 2£· cit,, p. 91.
32u. S., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Section 8(d).
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makes it illegal for a uni on to force an employer to bargain with that
union if it is not the recogni zed bargaining agent.

Another part of

Section 8(b) 4 makes the jurisdictional strike illegal.

This particular

section has been the subject of many National Labor Relation Board decisions because, linked with Section 10(k), which gives the National Labor
Relations Board the power to settle jurisdictional disputes, many
employers have brought such cases to the National Labor Relations Board.
Most jurisdictional disputes take place in the construction industry.
Section 8(b)5 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to
charge excessive dues and initiation fees.

This section was placed in

the Act to stop unions that have union shop agreements from taking
advantage of the position .
Section 8(b)6 makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to "cause
or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or
deliver any money or other thi ngs of value, in the nature of an exaction,
for services which are not performed or not to be performed. ,33

This

section is an attempt to stop the practice called "featherbedding."
Section 8(b)7 was not part of the original Taft-Hartley Act.
was added in 1959 as part of the Landrum-Griffin Act.
is a restriction on the use of picketing.34
three specific instances.

It

Section 8(b)7

It restricts picketing in

First, it is illegal for one union to picket

an employer who has already agreed to bargain with another union.

This

ties in with part of Section 8(b)4.
The second part of Section 8 (b)7 states that it is an unfair labor
33Northrup and Bloom, 2E· cit., p. 91.
34 The Bureau of National Affairs, The Labor Reform Law (Washington,
D. C.: Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1959), pp. 96-98.
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practice to use pic keting Rgainst an employer who has held a valid
electi on •d thin the preceding 12 months.
The third part of this section makes it illegal for a union to
picket an unorganized employer for more than 30 days before filing an
election petition with t he National Labor Relations Board.
Sec tion 8(b)7 wa s added to the list of unfair labor practices mainly
as a result of practices used by the Teamsters Union ,35 These practices
were uncovered by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in
the Labor Management Field, under the leadership of Senator John L.
McCellan (Democrat, Arkansas).
Section 8( b) gives management back some of the power i t , ..
1935, but more than anything it puts the government even moro cle• ply
into the area of labor relations.

The NLRB was also charged with the

administration of this section.
The second part of the Act dealt with strikes that concern national
security,

In thi s part of t he Act the President is given the power to

injoin a strike for up to 80 days i f the strike endangers the national
security.
This part of the Act gave management some power, for if a company
knew a stri e might be called and believed it would endanger national
security, it would be injoined.

The company would not have to bargain

quite so carefully.
The third major part of this act is section 14(b),
gives the s tates the right to pass right-to-work laws,

This section
A right-to-work

law can vary a great deal; but basically they are laws that provide for
lesser union security under the federal law, that is a state may pass
35Cohen, 2£• cit., p. 192.
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a l aw that makes one type or all types of union security illegal.
Section 14(b) could have given management many of its lost powers
i n dealing with unions, but only 19 states have right-to-work laws, and
of that number, none are really what might be called indus trial states,
It mus t also be noted that in many states that have right-to-work laws
the l aw has not been too effective,
The Taft-Hartley Act also lost some of its possible impact when the
United States Supreme Court made rulings in two 1953 cases36 that, for
most purposes, voided sec tion 8(b)6 - the anti-featherbedding section.
As noted above , the Taft-Hartley Act did give management back some
powers, but not as many as one might expect.
The last of the labor acts is the Labor lhnagement Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, better known as the Landrum-Griffin Act.

It was

designed to protect the individual union member and small employer from
the abuses of unscrupulous union leaders,
Beginning in 1956 the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities
in the Labor or lhnagement Field, under the leadership of John L. McCellan
(Democrat , Arkansas), began an i nvestigation into the activities of the
leaders of the Teamsters' Union.J7

The Committee found many malpractices

had been perpetrated by Teamsters' leaders ,

The investigation discovered

that many of the union leaders were guilty of taking bribes in exchange
for "sweetheart contracts," and tha t these union leaders were also using
pic keting, secondary boycotts, and extortion on small employers to gain
)6American Newspaper Publisher Association v. NLRB )45 U, S. 100 and
NLRB v, Gamble Enterprises, )45 U, S, 117.
37Northrup am moom, 2-E· cit., p. 146.
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their ends.

More impor tant. the union leaders were mi susing

1"

·n funds

and not giving the union members the right to voice opinions against t hi s
leadership.
The evidence brough t forth

qy

the McCellan committee prompted Robert

P. Griffin, Republican Representa tive of Michigan, and Phillip M. Landrum,
Democratic Representative from Georgia, to co-sponsor legislation to
correct the problem.

The bill they co-sponsored, The Labor-Management

Report and Disclosure Act of 1959 or Landrum-Griffin Act, was signed into
law by Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 14, 1959.
Act provided for the following:

lbe Landrum-Griffin

(1) that each member have the right to

nominate, vote, and speak in union election, and it set regulations on
the terms of office of leader and the way elections are to be carried
out; (2) that union report their finances, and employers to report any
pay given to union leaders; (3) it requires unions that have trusteeship
to report on thei r affairs ; (4) it prohibited Communists and recently
convicted criminals from holding office in a union.

In 1965 the United

States Supreme Court rul ed that a Communist could hold office in a labor
union; (5) i t contains seven amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act.
are three main amendments.3 8

There

The first sets down guide lines as to which

sector of government, federal or state, has jurisdiction over certain
labor disputes.

This amendment gives the states more power in labor

cases because in labor disputes where the National Labor Relations Board
does not have the time or resources to do the job, the state can be
given the power in many of the cases.
involve small employers.
38cohen, ~·cit., pp. 474-506.

lbe vast majority of these cases
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The second of these major amendments strengthens the rule s against
secondary boycotts and cer tain types of picketing.
In the third major amendment, the rules on unionism of cons truction

workers were changed so that a worker in the construction industry must
join the union within 7 days of hi s hire instead of the normal )0 days
in other industries.39

This was dono because of the seasonal and short

time involved with individual employers in construction work.

The major

ideas behind this act are to cut the power of union leaders, and give the
member his rights.
The employer is put into a slightly better bargaining position by
the Act .

The small employers are given better protection under the Act

by rea son of the increased power of the states to have jurisdiction over
labor disputes.

It also helped management by restricting the picketing

by a union that is not the bargaining agent with that company.
This gives management a stronger ability to resist union organizational campaigns.

The Act hurts some companies in that "sweetheart

contracts", a contract where the company is given privileges that are
not in most other contracts , such as no strike clauses or a lower wage.
The Act has helped management to some extent.
The past review of the history of labor and labor law will give the
insight needed to look at some of the current problems, but first a
review of a series of cases to show the way in which the court can change
over a relatively short period of time.

This is done because it will

add to the analysis used later in this paper.

For this the case

surroun:ling the so-called Thornhill Doctrine will be used.

This doctrine

was set down as a result of the United States Supreme Court decision in
39Northrup am moom, !!.2· cit., p. 146.
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the ca se of Thornhill ! · State of Ala bama.

The doctrine set forth the

idea that picketing is a manifes tation of free speech.
In 19 21 the Supreme Cour t handed down decisions in the Americ an

Steel Foundries case and the Truax !· Corrigan cas e, both of which
drastically limited the right of organized labor to engage in pic ke ting
activities,40

The decisions in the s e two cas es gave impe tus to many

s tates to enact anti-picketing laws,

Most of these state laws prohibited

one or more of the following types of picketing:
massed, fraudulent, and secondary picketing,

outsider, violent,

Most of these laws were

set up to protect the employer from loss of property or to stop general
violence.
In 19 23 the statQ of Alabama put a law into effect that proh:l,bited
all picketing. 41
of picketing.

This law made it a misdemeanor to engage in any type

The Thornhill cas e is the case that tests the constitu-

tionality of this Alabama statute.
to be a landmark decision in Labo r

The decision in this cas e is consi dered
la~< .

Section }448 of the State Code of Alabama reads as follows :
Sec. }448 . Loitering or picke ting forbidden.--Any person or
persons, who , without a jus t cause or l egal excuse therefore,
go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business
of any ot her person , firm, corporation, or an association of
people, engaged in a lawful business , for the purpose, or
with t he i ntent of influenci ng, of inducing other per sons not
to trade with , buy from, sell to, have business dealings with,
or be employed by such perso ns , firm, corporation, or association of persons, fo r the purpose of hindering, delaying, or
interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise
or another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing
herei n shall prevent any per son from s oliciting trade or business for a competitive busi ne ss ,42
4oMueller and ~ers, ~· cit . , p. 198.
41Ibid.
42cohen, ~· cit., p. 280.
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Byron Thornhill was a uni on l eader in the Brown Wood Preserving
Company, a pic kle- making company .

In 1937 the union went on strike.

The uni on compri sed all but four of the approximately one hundred
employees of the plant .

Due to Thornhill's leadership in the strike,

he was tried under Section 3448,
state courts.

He was found guilty by the Alabama

Hence, he a ppealed to the federal courts on the grounds

that Section 3448 was uncons t i tutional under the provisions of the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The provision of the First

Amendment that the United States cannot abridge the right of freedom of
speech, and the Fourteenth Amendment that says that States cannot deny
the rights of the Constitution to any person, were the ground on which
he based his claim.

Both the United States District Court and the United

States Circuit Court of Appeals found Mr. Thornhill "guilty of loitering
and picketing as charged in the complaint, "4 3 and the section was ruled
constitutional.

Thus, Mr. Thornhill took his case to the United States

Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court in a 8- 1 decision voted that Section 3448 was
unconstitutional.
Supreme Court are:

The main points of testimony brought out by the
fir st, that the picketing was done in a peaceful

manner and there were only two picket posts manned by six to eight men,
24 hours a day.44 These picketing posts were at the employees' entrance
to the plant and not on any public road.

Second, the picketing took

place on company property, but the picketers were never asked to leave

30
the company pro perty.

The third and mo s t important testimony wa s that

of two witnesses, a Clarence Simpson and a J . M. Walden.
a non-union employee of the Brown Wood Preserving Company.

Simpson was
On

the day

that the company scheduled the plant to resume operations , even though
the s tri ke was s till on, Simpson went to work.

As he approached the

employees' entrance, Thornhill came up to him and s tated that the union
was still on s trike, and the union did not want anybody to go to work.
Therefore, Simpson went home.
Simpson testified that at no time had Thornhill or any other union
member threatened him, either at the time of the strike or a s to the
testimony given before the courts .

Walden testified that he saw the

meeting between Simpso n and Thornl!Ul and tll;!t at no time dj.d i t /!ppea r
to him that 'l.b.ornhill was unfriendly toward Simpson and that he heard
no harsh words between the men.
With thi s tes timony in the background, the court made the following
point s:

Fir s t, Section )448 was unconstitutional under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments .

Second, the most important, picketing wa s con-

sidered speech and a form of dissemination of information, thus equating
free speech and picketing. 4 5 This idea that picketing and free speech go
hand in hand in what is known as the 'l.b.ornhill Doctrine.
The fall of the Thornhill Doctrine began the year after the decision
wa s handed down.ll6

In 1941 the Supreme Court ruled that where violence

i s involved in the picketing the courts could use injunctions to stop it.
Two cases in the late 194<l' s set down that stranger picketing and off- the45Ibid., pp. 199-203.
ll6Cohen , 2£· cit., pp. 286-306.
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job-site picketing were illegal .
In 1947 the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, although not aimed
at picketing, lis t ed a number of unfair union practices, and it wa s
clearly implied t hat unions were to be put in chec k to a certain extent
at leas t .

In

1950 three cases came down from the Supreme Court. All

were under the unfa ir labor practice issues of the Taft-Hartley Act, and
all i nvolved picketing.

In all three cases the court ruled that picket-

ing was unlawful if used to perpetrate an unfair labor practice.
I n 1957 the Supreme Court in the Vogt cas e states that if pic keting
was in restraint of trade i t was illegal.
In

1959 the Landrlllli-Griffin Act was passed. As part of this act

a new section was added to the unfair labor practices that unions can
perpetrate against employers,

This section places many restrictions upon

picketing,
By

this time i t is easy to see that the Thornhill Doctrine has been

largely abandoned, or as Jus tice William 0. Douglas observes:

"The Court

has come full circle and the state courts and state legislatures are free
to permit or suppress a picket line for any reason other than a blanket
policy against pic ke ting • .,47
Before going on one thing should be stated.

First, that the

historical background given in thi s chapter shows that management has
lost a great deal to labor in the past, and that only looking back to
what has gone on before can one have some idea of what may yet come,
Thus this historical background is very important first, because it
gives the background needed to understand the next chapters , and second,
47Ibid .• p . 291 .
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because i t will be used to help analyze the present position of the
management's rights as discussed in the next chapters,
With this background, this paper will review two recent labor
cas es and discuss their impact and importance.

CHAPTER III
This cha pter will review two current labor cases that have caused
much controversy.
The fir s t case to be reviewed is the Textile Workers Union of America
v . Darl i ngton Manufacturing Company.

This ca se wa s also argued as the

National Labor Rel ations Board!· Darlingt on Manufacturing Company .
When both ca ses went to the United States Supreme Court , they were
s ettled by the same dec ision.

This , being the former of t he above two

decisions, is listed as )80US263 in the Court record .

This case is

one in a series of deci sions both by the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts dealing with management's preroga tive s in the closing of
plants.

The case was adjudicated by the National Labor Relations Board,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the United
States Supreme Court.

All three of these groups came up with different

points of view of the case.
Background
The Darlington Manufacturi ng Company was a company that operated a
single textile mill in the state of South Carolina.
was partly owned by Deering Milliken, Inc.

Darlington in turn

Deering Milliken and Company

owned 41 pe r cent of the stock in Darlington until 1960 when i t and
Cotwool Ma nufacturing Corpo rati on merged.1

Cotwool held 18 per cent of

Darlington 's stock; thus the merged corporation, Derring Milliken, Inc,,
1Textile Workers v, Darlington Company. 380 U, S. 263 (1965) .
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owned 59 per eent of Darlington's s tock.

Deering Milliken, Inc. wa s

controlled by the Milliken family with Roger Milliken as the leader and
also as president of Darlingto n.

The Millikens also control Deering

Milli ken, Inc., and hold 6 per cent of Darlington's stock, 2 thus giving
the Milliken family 65 per cent control of Darlington.
family al so owned 16 other textile manufacturers,

The Milli ken

The other manufacturers

had 26 plants and all marketed the goods through Deering Milliken, Inc.
In March 1956 the Textile Wor kers Union began an organizational
campaign at Darlington.

During the organizational campaign the management

threatened to close down the plant if the union won the election for
representation to collective bargaining.
means to discredit the union.

The company also used other

Nevertheless, on September 6, 1956 , an

election was held and the union won by a very close margin.
On September 12, 1956, Roger Milliken called a meeting of the board
of directors of Darlington to consider shutting down the plant.3
was only 6 days after the union had won the election.

This

At the meeting ,

the board of directors decided to close the plant and sell the equipment.
The stockholders approved the action of the board on October 17, 1956;
as of that date, Darlington quit taking any, new orders for goods and
began the process of phasing out existing orders.

B,y the end of November,

the plant had been entirely shut down , and in December of 19.56 the company
had an auction and sold the plant's machinery and equipment.
Darlington ceased to exist.

Thus,
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The Cha r ges
After the plant wa s clos ed , the union filed charges with the
National Labor Relations Board.

Thes e charges claimed that Darlington

had committed no less than 3 unfair labor practices .

The union charged

that Darlington had violated sections 8(a)1 and 8(a)3 of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 i n the clo sing of the plant.

Section 8(a)1

ma kes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with, res train, or coerce
employees in the exerci s e of the ri ghts gu.aranteed in section 7. n 4
Section 7 gives workers the r ight to organize and do collective bargaining.
Section 8(a)3 states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any

term or oondition o£ employment, to encourage or
in any labor organization!'5

di~oour~gu

momberahip

The above two u¢'air labor practices ,

a ccording to the union, were perpetuated in the ordering of the plant
to be closed.

The union al so charged that the company had violated

section 8(a )5 i n not bargaining with the union after it won the election.
After the decision to clo s e the plant, union and management did meet,
but no bargaining took place.
The National Labor Relations Board gave its decision on the case
in 1962.

The NLRB was split 4-1 in this case, with board member Rodgers

as the di ssenter.

The NLRB found that the closure of the mill was in

violation of secti on 8(a) 3 on the grounds that Darlington President,
Roger Milliken, closed the plant because of his anti-union feeling.
Milliken stated in testimony before the trial examiner:

4u.

S. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, section 8(a)1.

5Ibid., section 8(a)3 .

"I felt that as a r esult of the campai gn that had been
conducted and the promi s es a nd s tatements made in these
letters that had been distributed (favoring unionization)
tha t if before we had had some ho pe, po ssible hope of
achieving compe t i tive (cos t) •• . by taking advantage of
na>r machinery that wa s baing put in, that this hope had
diminished as a result of the election because a majori~y
of the employees had vot ed i n favor of the union . • • "
The board said t ha t closing the plant without talking to the union to
sea what their proposals ware was a violation of section 8(a)5.

Thus,

if the shutting down of the plant was an illegal act , the lay-off of the
employee was in violation of sec tion 8 (a)1 .

Thus, the National Labor

Relations Board had found the company guilty on all the counts brought
against them by the union.

The board put teeth into its decision by

finding that Deering Milliken, controlled by the Milliken family and
the owner of the controlling stock in Darlington, was t o be held liable
for the unfair labor practices that Darlington had committed.

This was

so, the board ruled , because Darlington was part of a single integrated
employer group, the single employer being Deering Milliken .

Thus, Deering

Milliken had only shut down part of i ts business and was in violation
of the NLRA becaus e this part was shut down for discriminatory reasons.
The board ordered Deering Milliken to place those employees that
wanted to work in other Deering Milliken plants on preferential hiring
lists for those plants and to give back pay to all Darlington employees
that were discharged until they could find equivalent work.
Back pay can amount to a great deal of money.
it amounted to almost 2 million dollars.

In the Kohler case,

The Board cited Fiberboard

(379(U. 5.) 203) as a precedent for its decision.

In the Fiberboard case

6Textile Workers v. Darlington Company, 380 U, S. 263 (1965).
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the Uni ted States Supreme Court ruled that an empl oyer mus t bar gain
over decisions that are of a purely business nature i f t hey affec t the
union.

The Fiberboard case involved sub-contracting of maintenance

work.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 3- 2 decision did not grant
the NLRB an enforc ement order.

The Court of Appeals stated that even

though Deering Milliken was a single employer they had the right to
close part or all of t heir plant regardless of motives, anti-union,
or otherwise.
The National . Labor Relations Board appealed the decision of the
Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court.
renc:!.erell its decision on Ha:roh 29, 1995.

The Supreme Court

Th:i.s was a 7-9 c;!ecision with

Jus tice Stewart and Justice Goldberg not taking part in the decision.
Jus tice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court.
Justice Harlan divided the decision into two parts.

In the first

part he wrote concerning the charge of a violation of section 8(a)3 and
the subsequent violation of section 8 (a)1 in the closing of the plant.
The court ruled that , because of the complete liquidation of the company
in such a manner that the business was of no use to the management,
there had been no unfair labor prac t i ce committed.

The court stated:

An employer may not go completely out of business without
running afoul of the Labor Relations Act i f such action is
pr ompted by a desire to avoid unionization. Given the
Board ' s findi ngs on the issue of motive, acceptance of thi s
contention would carry the day for the Board's conclusion that
the closing of this plant ;ms an unfair l abor pr actice, even
on the assumpt ion that furlington is to be regarded as an
independent unrelented employer. A proposition that a single
businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants
to would represent such a startling innovation that it should
not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of
legisla tive intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so con-
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straining the Labo r Relation Act.

We find neither. 7

The court also ztated tha t as f ar as i t could see no current labor law
had ever meant t o sto p a business from clo sing .

The court said that

the NLRA did not compel a per son to become or remain a worker for a
par ticular company; thus, a company was not compelled to come into exist..
onc e or to remain in existenc e as an employer,
The union made three contentions.
only a lockout, or temporary shut down.

They felt t hat the closure was
The court ruled that because of

the complet enes s of the closing and the sale of the entire plant, there
wa s no intent of ever r eopening .
down.

Thus it could not be a lockout or shut

The co urt ha s ruled that discriminatory lockout s were unlawi'ul

in s everal ca s es, but complete and lasting closures never had been unlawf ul.

TI1e union als o contended that the sale of the pl ant and the equiP-

ment was a resal o of

plan~

issue,

The court ruled that because of the

piec e-meal sale of plan t and equipment, it was not a resa.le .

It has been

held by the courts that in the sale of a complete plant the new owner
can be held for the unfair labor practices of the former owner even if
the plant was shut down between owners,

Thi s was set forth in National

Labor Relations Board v, New 1-ndrid Manufacturing Company , but even in
this case the actual closure was not held to be an unfair labor practice.
The third union charge was that Darlington was a "runaway shop."

The

court ruled that i t was not a "runaway shop" becaus e first, the work
done at Darlington was not shifted to another plant; s econd, no new plant
was built to replace the clo s ed one; an:l third, no benefit wa s gained by
the company by closing,
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In the second part of the decision the court s tates that Darlington

was a single independent employer:

" The closing of an entire busines s,

evan though discriminatory, ends the employer-employee relationship." 8
The court then wont on to disagree with the Circuit Court on its
point concerning "partial closing . "

The court cited three cases, the first

being a ca se in which it wa s held that the discharge of the entire work
force and the hiring of new per s onnel to discourage unions was in
violat i on of the NLRA . 9

The others deal with the closing of a part or

department of a single business .

One was the discriminatory discharge

of the personnel in the wholesale department of a laundry. 10

The other

involved the discriminatory discontinuation of a shuttle service connect;l.n f-1 a mi],:!J.;~q ;l.nstaUa tion am a bus te~nal. 11

In l;>ot h cases the

partial shut down discouraged unionization of the rest of the business,
To clarify i ts point the court goes on to s tate:
While we have spoken in terms of a "partial closing" in the
context of the Board's finding that Darlington wa s part of a
l a r ger single enterprise controlled by the Milli ken family,
we do not mean to suggest that an organizational integration
of plants or corporations is a neces sary prerequisite to the
establishment of such a violation of section 8 (a)3. If the
per sons exercising control over a plant that is being clos ed
for anti-union reasons (1) have an interest in another
business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the
same line of commercial activity a s the clo s ed plant, or
sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping
8Ibid.
9Labor Board v, Norma Mining Corp ., 206 F, 2d 38.
10Labor Board v. Savoy Laundry, 327 F. 2d 370.
11rabor Board v . Missouri Transit Co., 250 F. 2d 262 .
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a benefit from the discouragement of unionization i n that
business ; (2) ac t to clos e their plant wi th the purpos e of
produc i ng such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to
the other business which makes i t realistically fore s eeable that its employees will persist in organizational
ac t ivities" we think an unfair labor practice has been
made out,1 c.
The court conclud'e s by remanding its decision to the Circuit
Court.
It is interesting that the Court did not consider the violation of
section 8(a)5 directly, probably because by rule the closure would
be illegal on the grounds for which a violation of this section would
be founded or destroyed because one cannot bargain at a plant that
does not exist.
The decision in this case and the series of which it is the most
important part to date help define an area of management prerogatives
heretofore left untouched by the NLRB and the Courts.

Before the

decisions in thi s area, it was commonly held that management had the
prerogatives to close at any time for any rea s on.
As for Darlington, it won i t s case in the courts; but the more
far-reaching points are yet to be discussed.
The reason for the importance placed on the Darlington case is
that it is the decision or point a t which the courts ruled in favor
of management.

The controversy surrounding the NLRB's and the Court's

movement into this area of management's prerogatives and the stand of
management's prerogatives as to plant closings will be a part of the
next chapter of this paper,

12Textile Workers v . Darlington Company. 380 U. S. 263 (1965).

41
The General Electric Case
Thi s case deals with management's preroga tives as t o choo sing the
manner i n which it will do collective bar gaining ,
The full name of the case is General Electric Company and International Union of Electrical, Radio, and M9.chine

~lorkers,

AFL-CIO case, a

decision that wa s r endered on Dec ember 16, 1964 by the NLRB.

Thi s

deci sion i s one of the most recent in a series handed down by the
National Labor Relations Board which have caused much controversy over
the Board's i nterpretation of certain unfair labor practices and the
definition of an unfai r labor prac tice under the provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act as amended,
Background
To understand this decision, a l ook at the bargaining techniques of
the General Electric Company and the Company's general attitude toward
labor unions is imperative.

The General Electric Company (GE) employed

a pproximately 250,000 employees at the time of the dis pute {1960), of
whom about 120,000 were in organized bargaining units.

The International

Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE) was by
far the largest single union wi th whom General Electric dealt.
represented some 70,000 GE workers, 13
Uni ted Electrical Work Union (UE).

It

The IUE is an outgrowth of the

This outgrowth came about i n 1950

when the UE was ous t ed from the CIO for alleged Communist domination.
13National Labor Relations Board, Intermediate Report: General
Electric and International Union of Electrical , Radio, and M9.chine
Workers, AFL-CIO , prepared by Arthur Leff (Washington, D. C.:
National Labor Relations Board , 1963), p. 3 .
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The IUE wa s formed from the part of the United Electrical 11or k Union
that wanted to s tay in the CI O.

Bes ides the IUE, General Electric

had some 10,000 workers still i n the UE with whom i t bargained.

The

approximately 4o,OOO other organized workers were divided among more
than 100 other unions.
In 196o the IUE had 105 bar gaining units with General Electric,
and almost all of t hes e units were involved i n the di spute . 14

The

reason for this i s that GE and the IUE, by mutual acquie sc ence,
bar gained on a na t ional or multi-unit basis.

General Electric was the

first company to engage in thi s type of bargaining when the Company and
the IUE signed their first contract in Sept~mber, 1950. 15

These national

contracts are for general items of bargaining, and in mos t cases the
individual bargaining units may add any special i tern i n local bargaining
that are cons i stent with the national contract.
The 1950 contract was followed by renewal agreements in 1951, 1952,
1954, and

1955. The 1955 contrac t was a five-year contract.

In the

contracts presented during the years from 1950 to 196o, the Company
wa s known for bei ng fair in its approach to the terms of the contracts.
The reason for this fairness, as General Electric saw i t, was the way in
which GE went about its bargaining and how it arrived at its bargaining
provisions .
The evaluation of General Electric's bargaining policies dates back
to 1946, for i t was in 1946 that General Electric was jolted by a very

bitter strike. 16

General Electric had gone to the bargaining table with

14Ibid ,
15Ibid,. p. 4.
16Ibid,, pp. 6-7.

43
an offer of a 10 cants an hour wage increase, but by the time the strike
wa s over, the Company had to give an 13t cents an hour wage increase to
its employees .

This strike forced GE t o ta ka a long look at its approach

to employee and union rela tions.
The development of a new a pproach to General Electric's labor problems
came under the guidance of Lemuel R. Boulware, who s erved than and for
many years after (but not in 1960) as General Electric's Vice-President
of Relations Service,

The approach that Boulware developed has become

known a s "boulwareism". 17
The new a pproach at General Electric entailed all the principles of
personnel relations one learns in the textbooks . 18 One of the main
pr i nciples is that a company should give employees job satisfaction, and
in this way gain the loyalty and support of employees by showing the
employees that the goals of the Company and their goals are the same
and that the Company is a good employer
bes t interes ts of its workers.

b~ause

it looks out for the

General Electric's approach was to make

the employees fe el and understand that it ,was the Company ' s aim to do the
right thing voluntarily.

The idea behind this wa s to show the worker

that he did not need a labor or ganization to obtain what was his fair
share of rights.

This approach is one of the points upon which the

National Labor Relations Board had to deciQ.e as to whether an unfair
labor practice had been per petrated against the Union,
17Sanford Cohen, Labor Law (Columbus, Ohio:
Books, Inc., 1964) , p, 203.

The Board's

Charles E. Merrill

18Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, Personnel: The Human
Problems of Management (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : 1964), p. 111,
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ruli ng on thi s approach will be discussed later in this paper.
Under this approach t o bar gaining, General Elec tric t ook upon itself
t o s eek out what was r ight for its employees.

This was done by year-

r ound research into all a spects of labor relations. 19

The research

included s tudies into business conditions, compe titive factors, and
economic trends in general.

General Electric als o ga thered its own

information from meetings with employees, direct discussion between
supervi sors and employees, and the publishing of statements in both
union and company publications to survey the needs and desires of its
employees.

Also, at the beginning of each contract bargaining, General

Electric would listen to a nd evaluate the union' s demands and add the
information thus obtained to their total research.

Armed with the

facts of their research, General Electric would make a determination
of what was "right". 20

lhen General Electric made an offer to the

union , and this offer included everything the company deemed just ,
This offer wa s made with the idea that, unless the union could point
out where the company r esearc h was wrong, this was to be a "take-itor-leave-it" offer .

The Company repeatedly emphasized to its employees

and the union the fact that it would not depart from its offer for
anything other than f ac t s s howing the offer to be wrong, and that
threat of s trike or a s trike itself would not change their position
because t o the Company any change in their position would be "wrong". 21
In an attempt to be effective, General Electric based its general
19National labor Relations Board, Intermediate Report, loc, cit ,
20 Ibid, , pp. 6-10 .
21Ibid.
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bargaining philosophy on an elaborate system of management-employee
communications which entailed the use of plant newspapers, daily news
digests, employee bulletins, letters to employees' homes, television and
radio broadcasts , and other mass media communication as well as, perhaps
most important, a great deal of per sonal contacts .

As stated previously

the Company used almost every type of personnel relations tactics
possible,
Two other points of t his background are also important,

First,

in deali ng with over 100 different unions, General Electric offered each
the same basic programs.

This was based on ,the idea that no union should

get more favorable treatment than any other,, thus showing the fairness
of the Company to all its workers.22
Second, about half of General Electric's employees were not in labor
organiz~tions,

and from time to time either representation or decertifi-

cation elections were held,

At these time s, the Company made it quite

clear that i t did not like unions, and it used its communication system
to put this idea across, 23

This system was ,.also used in the .196o

bargaining period as i t had been employed in the past.

It may be noted

that at no time did the National Labor Relations Board consider the use
of this communication system as an unfair labor practice until 196o.
It is also important to note that the Company gave the non-union workers
the same basic programs that the union workers were given.

With this

background of the bargaining philosophy of the Company, it is easy to
22 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
23Ibid .' p. 14.
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see that trouble was bound to occur in 1960 .
The Negotiations of 1960
In early 1960 both GE and the IUE were preparing for negotiations . 24

The IUE sent to each of its workers employed by General Electric a ballot
listing 19 demands.
of priority.

Each worker was asked to list the demands in order

According to the ballots job security ranked first and

economic benefits ranked second.

Through research which had been done,

the Company also had a good idea that job security and higher wages
would be among the Union's major demands.

The Company believed that

the 1955 contract had been too lenient in respect to the wage issue.
Th@ reasoq for this was

th~t

due to the inflation of the late 1950's

the cost-of-living escalator clause in the 1955 contract had cost the
Company a great deal more than it had expected.

Thus, the Company,

knowing that the economic improvements to be offered in 1960 would not
be too great, embarked upon a campaign designed to build employee
support for its positions.

This campaign was called "Building Employee

Understanding in 1960", and General Electric used its communication
system to the utmost. 2 5
In early 1960 pre-negotiation meetings were held to exchange

information.

On June 13, 1960, formal negotiations began. 26

From the

very outset of negotiations it was apparent to both sides that it was
going to be a long, hard-fought battle before terms of a new contract
would be reached.
24

On the first day of negotiations the IUE challenged

Ibid .• pp. 13-17.

25Ibid • • p. 10 .
26 Ibid

--··

pp. 13-1 8.
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the Company on its stand on personal accident insurance .

vii thout

bargaining the point with the Union, GE went out on its own and arranged
with an insurance company for an accidental death or dismemberment gro up
insurance policy under which all individual General Electric employees
who desi r ed to pa r ticipate could do so. 27
insura nce plan on four main points: 28

The Union objected to this

first, t he Union wa s paying the

cos t of the plan for its members ; s econd, the cost as reported by the
Company wa s too high and could be lowered by obtaining a blanket policy
covering the whole Union; thi rd, t he plan decreased the Union's ability
to negotia te on other phases of the
in offering

t~e

contra~t;

fourth, and mos t important,

insuranc e on a take-it-or-+, eave-it basis General Electric

was discrediting the Union and thus undermtning good faith collective
bargaining.

This point was one of the iss11es brought out by the National

Labor Relations Board in its decision in the case.
In the next few meetings following June 1J, the IUE set down its

demands.

These demands were basically a s follows: 29

(1) a

Jt

percent

annual wage i ncrea se, ( 2) a cost-of-living escalation clause, (J ) more
paid holidays, (4) adjustments due to
work, (6) unemployment benefi ts, (7)

the pension

~an,

auto~tion,

separ~tion

(5) equal pay for equal

pay, (11) improvement in

and (1 2) several other minor non-economical matters.

As soon as the Company obtained the
27Ibid .• p. 15
28Ibid.
29 Ibid •• p. 16 .

U~ion

demands, it began to

pres ent its case directly t o the workers .

General Electric used its

communication sys tem to cut nearly every Union demand.
196o, a Company newsletter was sent to all employees.

On July 1,
In this news-

l etter the Company stated that if the IUE's demands were met the added
cost "could destroy thousands upon thousands of jobs. ,30

This type of

Company communicati on continued throughout the entire bargaining period
despite heavy Union protest .
From June 13 until the middle of July both sides talked in general
terms without getting down to any of the basic issues.

By mid-July the

bargaining, centered around employment security problems, began in earnest.
This bargaining continued until early August.

On August 1, 196o, the

IUE informed GE that if a contract was not agreed upon by October 1, 1960,
it would call a strike.3 1

Talks continued through August, and during

this time other Union demands were considered.

Finally, on August 30 ,

196o, General Electric set down what is cal:j.ed a "fair but firm offer".
This offer wa s in keeping with General Electric's "Boulwareism" bargaining .

Thus, in reality this offer was final unless the IUE could bring up

facts which would force the Company to change their position on one
point or another.
Union demands ,

General Electric's offer was considerably less than

The offer contained:J2

(1) , a 3 percent increase at its

outset with a 4 percent increase 18 months later, and the oontraot was
to cover a three-year period with no cost-of-living escalator clause;

(2) certain benefits if employees were laid .off; (3) a loan plan and an
JOibid. , p. 17-18.
31 Ibid •• p.

25.

32Ibid • • pp . 29-30.
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emergency aid plan; and (4) improvements in both pension and insurance
plans.
From August JO to September 8 the bargaining continued without any
progress toward a contract,

On September 8 , 1960 , negotiations were

sus pended until September 20, 196o , because of the IUE national convention.

During the convention period, General Electric launched a campaign

to induce local offi cials and individual employees to influence other
employees not to strike.
On September 20 , 196o, negotiations proceeded with General Electric
declaring that its offer wa s on the table and that the IUE could take it
or leave it.JJ
Servig~

The next day the Federal Conciliation and Mediation

entered intp the negotiation

~t

the

req~est

9f the IUE.

Also,

on this day the IUE filed charges with the National labor Relations
Board, against General Electric for failure to bargain in good faith.
Two other events occurred in late September that came into play in
the later National Labor Relations Board decision,J 4

These events were;

fir st, the Company's rejection of the idea that the terms of the 1955196o contract be continued until a new contract agreement was signed,
and second, General Electric' s refusal to give the union information
relevant to cost and other bargaining issues,

The Union filed its second

charge against the Company with the NLRB stating that this withholding
of information was an unfair labor practice,
On October 2, 196o, the Union went on strike, but talks . still
JJibid .• p. 51.
J4Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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continued.

Shortly after the s trike began , General Elec tric bega n to

bargai n directly with some of the IUE l ocals , and in two instances the
Company offe r ed the locals bett er terms than it had offered the national
union.

Gener al Electric continued local bargaining until October 19,

196o, at which time it declared that the negotiations had reached an
impasse a nd that the IUE should capitulate,
day.

The Union capitulated that

The Union gave up the s trike becaus e it had been a total failure,

This failure had resul ted because many of the Union worker s continued
to work through the strike,

The strike officially ended on October 22,

1960; on November 10, 196o , a new three-year contract was signed between
General Electric and the IUE.
tq~ Com~ny ' ~ off~r a l~ st

This new three-year contract followed

to the

l~tter.

In the post-strike period, the IUE filed additional charges against
General Electric,

The Union charged that:35

(1) the Company's overall

approach to bargaining was illegal; ( 2) bargaining with locals during
the time of strike was illegal; (3) the strike was an unfair labor
practice strike, and 20 workers who had been replaced during the stri ke
should be reinstated and given back pay.
The Decision
The charges filed by the IUE sta ted that the Company had viola ted
Sect ion 8 (a) 1, ), and 5 of the National Labor Relations Act of 19)5 . 36
35Nati onal Labor Relations Board , Decision: General Electric
Company ! • International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Wo r kers, AFL-CIO (Washington, D. C. : National Labor Relations Board,
1964)' p, 1.
J 6 Ibid . , 1-18,
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Section 8(a )1 basically states that i t is illegal for an employer to
res train or coerce employees in their right to bargain collecti vely.37
Section 8(a) 3 basically sta tes that it is illegal f or an employer to
discriminate aga ins t an employee becaus e of uni on membership. 38
8(a )5

basical~y

Section

s tate s that it i s illegal for an employer to refu se to

barga in collec t i vely.39
With thes e provisions of the l aw i n mind, the National Labor
Relations Boa rd began hearings on July 24, 1961, under the direction
of trial examiner Arthur Leff.
1963.

The hearings were clo s ed on January 29,

The basic points of evidence brought, out i n the se hearings were

previously stated i n the first two parts of this paper.

On April 1,

1963 , the trial examiner 's report was filed with the National Labor
Relations Board.

This report was s trongly in the Union's favor . 40

On December 16, 1964 , the National Labor Relations Board, in a 4-1
decision, that General Electric had not bargained in good faith and had,
therefore, violated Sections 8(a)1 and 5 . 41

The National Labor Rela-

t ions Board stated that General Electric had bargained i n bad faith i n
that:

(1) it did not furni sh the Union with the i nformati on it reque s ted,

( 2) i t attempted to bargai n with individual union locals while bargaining
with the national Union, {3) it presented . the insurance plan on a takeit-or-leave-it basis, and (4) i t s overall approach to collective
37cohen , ££· cit,, pp. 446-447.
38 Ibid.
39Ibid.
40 National Labor Relations Board, Decision, loc , cit.
41Ibid,
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bargaining was not consis tent with good faith bargaining.
Finding the Company guilty of bad faith bargaining , the National
Labor Relations Board ordered General EJ.ectric to:

(1) supply the IUE

with the information reque s ted, (2) reinstate the 20 workers who had
been laid off and give them back pay, (J) cease using its present form
of bargaining.
This decision is more far-reaching than are the orders agains t
General Electric because for the first time the National Labor Relations
Board stated that techniques of bargaining are subject to approval or
disapproval by the Board .

General EJ.ectric, along with others , believe

that the Board's decision on the Company's overall technique of bargain-

believed by some that this decision takes away the rights of the individual workers in that it requires an employer to deal with the employees
through the Union, not the Union through the employee.
The Company has a ppealed the decision of the National labor Relations Board to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,42

The deci sion of

the Court of Appeals should be rendered by the end of 1967 and both sides
have stated that if the ruling goes against them, they will then go to
the United States Supreme Court for its decision in the case.
sides are attempting to get public opinion to suppo rt them.

Both
At the

present time , General EJ.ectric seems to have obtained most of the public
support, but Frank W. McCulloch, chairman of the National labor Relations
42nFJ.ood of Comment in Nation 1 s Press Supports Company in NLRB
Case, " Relations Newsletter (New York, New York: General Electric
Company, February 1, 1965), p. 1.
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Board, ha s given s everal speeche s saying, in effect, that the Board is
being misinterpreted on this decision,
The next

r

'qr will deal with controversy surrounding this

decision , and what it possibly could mean to management's prerogatives.

CHAPTER IV
THE CONTROVERSY AND MANAGEMENT
Prerogatives Present Position
Darlington Case,

From the outs et of the Darlington decision, there

was a great deal of controversy.

One writer even went so far ·a s to say:

" that going out of business , under current labor laws, may be even more
ha zardous than keeping a plant open. " 1
The main point of contention i n this cas e is, does management have
the right to clos e a plant without fear of running the wrath of the NLRB?
The Board said that if the closing was for di s criminatory reasons then
the company has committed an unfair labor practice, but thi s ruling was
based on the idea that Darlington was a part of a larger company; namely,
Deering Milliken,

It would have been interesting to see what the outcome

of the board would have been if Darlington had been, in their opinion, a
single business as both courts said it was.

This is probably the key to

deci sions, for as the Supreme Court said, to say that a single business
cannot close without committing an unfair labor practice is too great a
change from what the congress meant in the framing of the Nation Labor
Relations Act.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, but after the Circuit Court's
decision, Frank W. McCulloch, chairman of the Nation Labor Relations
Board, said:
"However in Darlington Mfg. Co. where the employer sold an entire
plant to avoid dealing with the union, the Board did not order it
1M. R. Lefkoe, "The NLRB's New, Rough Line," Fortune, November,
196), p . 164.
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to re purchase a nd r eprove the f acility , but did direct the employer
to offer its laid-off employees positions at other of its nearby
plants, to plac e them on certa i n preferential hiring lists, and
to pay moving expenses and back pay . ., z
The quotation from the chai rman of the NLRB is interesting in that the
chairman doe s talk of repurcha sing and reopening of the plant.

He might

have meant that the Board could have gone farther than i t did or even
that it may have consi dered making Deering Milliken reopen Darlington.
This would have been an even greater departure from the past and shows
that the NLRB at least may have thought about completely striping management of its right t o close f or discriminatory reasons,
It is interesting to note that in October of 1965 McCulloch gave a
speech in which he said, in reference to the Darlington case, that the
public had misinterpreted the Board and that the Board was taking cases
only one at a time and was not out to set presidence with each case it
decided,
The reason for this softer line was probably caused by the court's
refusal to uphold the Board' s decision and the several articles written
in the period just prior to the court decision.
as:

Articles with such titles

Fortune's "The NLRB s, New, Rough Line,"3 Iron Age's "The Attack on
1

funagements Rights, ., IJ. Dun• s Review's "New Policy for the NLRB, .,5 and
2
Frank W, HcCulloch, Chairman of NLRB, An Evaluation of the Remedies
Available to the National Labor Relations Board-Is there Need for
Legislative or Administrative Change?, An address given before the
Federal Bar Association, Labor Law Committee, The Ambassador Hotel, Los
Angeles, California: June 1:3 , 1964.

3Lefkoe , loc, cit .
lj."The Attack on funagement Rights," Iron Age, January 21, 1965,
p. :38.

5Thomas R. Brook, "New Policy for the NLRB?", Dun's Review and
Modern Industry, July, 1965, p. 56.
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Nations Busine sses, "Let s Stop labor Board's Unfair Practices. "6 All
these attacked the Board for its infringement on management's prero ga tives
and mos t made direct r eference to the Board' s ruli ng i n the Darlington
case.
Has the criticism and the Court's decision changed the NLRB's stand
on closures?

I t i s felt t hat the answer to this ques tion could be yes.

The reason for t his is that in two recent decisions the NLRB ha s bac ked
off t o a certain extent.

In the Pierce Governor Co. case ,? the company

moved its plant 32 miles.

'Ibis company talked with the union and said

it would consider for transfer each old employee who applied and would
give them there old seniority if they were hired, but the company stated
that it would not guarantee jobs for all the old workers.

The company

al so stated that it would not recognize the union at the new plant unless
it won

represet;~ta tion.

to bargain,

The union then charged the company with failure

The Board said that the company had carried out its obliga-

tion to the worker at t he old plant, and because a majority of the old
plant's employees did not want to be transferred to the new plant, the
company did not have to recognize the union,
The other case may be even more important.
~

In the MCLoughlin Mfg . 8

the company closed the plant when no agreement could be reached with

the union over a change in a seniority clause that caused excessive cost
to the company.

Just before the closing, an out-of-s tate community per-

6
stuart Rothman , "Lets' Stop labor Boarct•s Unfair Practices, "
Nations Business, May, 1965, p. 34.
7"Two NLRB Ruling s on Bargaining in Plant Removal Cases, " Bureau
of National Affairs: Labor Relations Reporter, May 8, 1967, pp:-T:27
8Ibid.
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suaded the company to move their pla nt there.
the union of the r elocation .

The company did not tell

The union filed charges , the NLRB ruled

that the company should have told the union of the change in plans, this
was a technical refusal to bargain but no remedial order wa s necessary.
The board stated that, because the new plant was being built by the
community on the sti pulation that l ocal people be hired, and that there
wa s no sign that the old employees would want to transfer, no order wa s
required,

Both these cases have been handed down this year.

Thus, in two cases, that are in some respects similar to Darlington,
the NLRB has rendered a seemingly less harsh decision from managements
point of view.

Where doe s that leave us today with respect to managements

pr@ro&ati ve§ in

closur e~

and the Qontroversy over the

O~ rlins ton

decision?

The controversy over the case itself has died down to a great extent
since the Supreme Court's dec ision .

The controvers y over the Board's

ruling, is still carried forth when management wants to make the point
that the NLRB is trying t o take away management 1 s rights .
All this leads to
are today.

>~hat

management's prerogatives in plant closing

As sta t ed earlier in this paper, by use of the Thornhill case

and the cases surroundi ng i t , labor law, as it is known today, in mo s t
instances is derived from a series of cas es.

Thus, what is being looked

at is the result of a series of cases surrounding the Darlington case.
Before the Darlington case, management could not close a plant and
then transfer the wor k to another plant . 9

It could not close one plant

and open a new plant i n another town to replace the old one. 10

It could

9NLRB v . New Madrid Mfg . Co., 215 F. 2d 908, 914,
10 NLRB v. Pres ton Feed Corp. , 309 F. 2d 346, and Labor Board v.
Wallick198 F. 2d 477.
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not close part of the pl ant that was unionized and keep the rest open, 11
It could no t clo s e a plant, until the worker r enounced the union, and then
reopen the plant. 12 After the Darl i ngton deci sion, what are management's
prerogatives?

A single owner can have his plant clo s ed by mana gement a t

any time, for any reason, anti-union or not ,

If the company is an inter-

graded multi-plant concern, then management must cope with the following
rules,

In closing a plant management must be able to show that i t ha s

gained no benefit by closing a unionized plant,

Nor can management , in

a mul t i-plant company, use closure or threat of closure to discourage
unionized plants ,
From the stand point of the multi-plant company, the Supreme Court
spelled out what it must do to stay out of trouble,

Thus , i f the Iarling-

ton case did anything, it cut the power of the multi-plant company by the
setting forth of these rule s, of course, both single and multi-plant
managers still come under all the pre-Darlington decisions as far as
partial clo sing , lock out, etc. are concerned,
As for single business, its preroga tives have not changed.
why, one might a sk, "!las the NLRB softened 7"

Then

The answer would be, as

s tated above, the decision of the Court did not go along with the Board,
the criticism of the NLRB wa s great,
out,

Now a third point should be brought

In the period of time while the Darlington case wa s in the Courts,

management began to bargain with the union over plant closure, the rea son
for thi s was that management did not know whioh way the Courts were going
to come out on the case,

Thus with the other case in the background and

11NLRB v. Savoy laundry, 327 F. 2d 370 , and labor Board v. Missouri
Transit Co., 250 F. 2d 261.
12NLRB v. Norma Mining Corp, , 206 F. 2d 38.
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Darlington with its rul es, management is bargaining over plant closure,
and the NLRB is saying that by doing this management is meeting its
obliga tion under the NLRA.
Mana gement gained back none of the prerogatives it lo s t before the
Darling ton decision and probably lost some ground in the Darlington decision, but to a greater or lesser extent management now bargains over
plant closure.

Thus , it could be said that another area that used to be

part of management's right is now gone.
The General Electric Case
This cas e differs from Darlington in that it is the first case to
arise in this area , thus there is no series of cases to draw on.

Some

cases have arisen in the area of general approaches to bargaining; these
will be discussed in this section, but before getting

to the general

effect of the case, a look at the controversy surrounding it should be
taken.
The controversy in this case surrounds two main points, one the
right of an employer to present his side of a labor issue to his employees
and the other the broad i nterpretation the Board made of section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act of

193~.

The General Elec tric Company is the mo s t . upset over, what it calls ,
the right of "free speech" that i t claims the ,Board has ta ken away.

Virgil

B. Day, General Electric 's Vice-President of Management Development and
Employee Relations services, stated:

"This challenge to management's

right to communicati on with employees could be disas trous.

The central

issue, of course , is the right of free speech,,and the employees' right to
know management's views as well as the union view about business facts
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affecting their jobs." 13 On another occasion Day s ta tad :

"1rfe believe

t ha t employees have t he right to know where the Company s tands on
controversial issues between their management a nd their union--and
that they have t he right to hear it f rom the Company, not someone al sa, n14
As noted in the pr evious chapter, one concept that Boulwarism is
basad on is the communication between employees and management.

This

idea finds good foundation in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
for section 8(c) s tates:
Free speech. The expressing of any view, argument, or opinion,
or the dissemination thereof , whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form shall not consti tute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat r;>f reprisal or force or promise of
benafi t . 15

Several di££erent law publications
interpretation of section 8(c) such as :

hav9 attadk~d th~

Board

Oft thai~

The Duke law Journal,16 Temple

law Quarta~1 7 and the Michigan Law Raviaw.1 8

The above publications

all s tate that the Board ha s put itself in a hard to defend position.
In t he Michigan law Review i t is stated that the Boards know there will

13virgil B. Day, Vice-President Management Development and Employee
Relations Services, General Electric Company, labor Management Relations
in a NeHly Competitive World, An address before the 1964 Midwinter Personnel
Conference, American Management Association, Chicago, Illinois: February
14, 1964.
14virgil B. Day, Vice-President , Management Development and Employee
Relati ons , General Company, Communicat~ns-A Neglected Key to Competitive
Progress , An address before the Annual Conference of the International
Council of Industrial Editors, Denver, Colorado: June 18, 1963.
15u,

s.,

National labor Relations Act of 1935, Section 8(c).

16David L. Banetar , "GE-Uniqua Situation or Broad Impact," labor Law
Journal, March, 1966 , p. 166 .
17Ibid., p. 166-167.
18Ibid.
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be a great deal of adverse r eaction to t he decision, but the Board feels
that this reaction will not be enough to get thei r decision overthrown .
One other point the criti cs of this pa rt of the decision make is
that General Electric is being deprived of its rights under the First
Amendment of the Constituti on.
The defense put up by the Boa rd on the above criticism will be
reviewed after a discussion of the criticism that surrounds the deci sion
a s to its interpretation of section 8 (d).

This is done because the Board

defends itself on a total stand saying that the total approach is unlawful,
not the parts.

It almost says that what is lawful in part or by itself

is not lawful when put together in a t otal plan of bargaining.
Section 8 (d ), a s reviewed in chap ter II of this paper, basically
s tates that good faith bargaining does not oblige management to meet union
proposals with counterproposals or concession.
The tri al Examiners report stat ed that section 8(d) "wa s not designed
a s a shield to protect surfac e bargaining, " ,this report was upheld by the
Board.

Thus, the Board is saying t hat an employer cannot bargain with a

ta ke-it-or-leave-it attitude even i f the employer states that he will
change his position if evidence can be brought forth to show where his
stand is unreaJ,is tic.

It is easy t o see why the critics s tate that the

Board's decision forces employers to meet propo sals with counterproposals
or concession.

Thus, these critics s tate the only type of bargaining

that can s tand the wrath of the NLRB is some type of give-and-take
bargaining .
One of the most out spoken critics of this part of the Board's decision
is the noted management-relation author , Herbert R, Northrup, also one
time General Electric's labor relations consultant.

The period of time
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he was a consultant for GE could ha ve very easily overlaped Lemuel R.
Boulware's period at GE.

Northrup says , in effect, that GE's approach

to labor relations is, perhaps, one of the best; and the NLRB has dealt
GE a great injustice.
Northrup ha s some co urt presidence to back hi s position as far as
GE's violation of Section B(a)5 (good faith bargaining) and its connection
with Section B(d) , because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated
in the Fitzgerald Mills case : 19
"It i s not the proper function of the Board or the courts to
determine the proper resolution of differences arising during
the course of negotiations. ay necessity, a company may begin
negotiations with certain firmly set convictions on the matters
subject to negotiations, and is not obligated to yield."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in the Herman Sausage
~, 20

"If the insis tence is genuinely and sincerely held, i t is not mere
window dressing, it may be maintained forever even though it produces a stalemate. Deep conviction firmly held from which no
withdrawal will be made may be more than the traditional opening
gambit of a labor controversy. It may be both the right of the
citizen and essential to our economic legal system of free
collective bargaining. "
It should be n9ted that it was on this point {section B(d)) that the
Board ~ember L~edon di ssented, thus, making the 4-.1 decision.

With all

this well-founded critic ism what does the Board say in its own behalf?
The Board's most used defense is that General Electric is a special case,
The Board s tates in its 1965 report that General Electric had developed
a unique bargaining technique . 21

Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman of the

19NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills, 313 F. 2d

260

(1963) .

20NLRB v . Herman Sausage Co., 275 F. 2d 229 (1960).
21 Thirtieth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board for
the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1965 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1966), p. 69.
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NLRB, had a pplied accept ed princi pl es to a unique situation. 22 The
princi ples that McCulloch spea ks of a re the court rulings in the Truitt
Manufacturing cas e. 23

This ruling f ound the employer gui lty of not

bargaining in good faith , but t hi s case did not condemn a total approach
t o bargaining,
sai d that a
recur.

Saul J. Jaffe , t he as sociate s olictor of the NLRB, has

sit~tion

li ke that at General Electric may perhaps never

Thus, the Board i s found standing on two main points one that

GE is a special case and that only by looking at the total effect of GE
labor relations a pproach can it be condemned,
The unique situation of the Board can come under partial attack in
that in 1965 the Board ruled in two cases24 and in 1966 in one 25 other
that a firm stand at the bargaining table is unlawful .

In all these

cases the Board basically s tated tha t the employers were not bargaining.
The major question now i s what will the Courts rule in the case?
There are basically three po ssibilities.

First that the Courts will

uphold the NLRB on every point in the case ,

This seems unlikely, but if

it did happen management would losl' a great deal of its power.

It would

lo s e much power in the area of communications with its employees.

It

would lose the power to depart f rom the traditional bargaining method .
It would also lose regulation over i t s

barga~ning

techniques.

22 Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman NLRB, The Polio~, the Purpose and the
1
Philosophy of the NLRB a s Revealed i n Decision Tren s, A speech g~ven
before the Texax Manufacturers Assoc iation, 43rd Annual Conference, Fort
Worth, Texas, October 28, 1965.
23NLRB v. Truitt~· Co. , 351 U. S, 149, (1956) ,
24Memorial Consultants Inc ., 153 NLRB No. 3, 1965, and H. K. Porter
Company, Inc,, 153 NLRB No, 119,(1965).
25stark Ceramics, Inc, , 155 NLRB No. 120, (1966),
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On the other hand the s econd poss ible court ruling would be to tell
the !ba rd it wa s wrong.

This would be a victory for mana gement's pre-

r oga tives in that none of th e above res trictions would be placed on
them .
But the third possi ble ruling of the court is, perhaps , the most
likely to occur.

That is th e cour t will rule on some points for General

Electric and aga i ns t others .

I t s eems that a possible ruling would be

to rule against the company on t he charges of failure to furnish information and the bypass ing of the nat ional union, while ruling for the
company on firm bargaining and overall attitude or approach to labor
management relations.

This would be a victory for Boulwarism and

management in general becaus e the two latter charges are the most important to management's prerogati ves .

It should be s tated that the above

is just a possibility, perhaps a more possible, ruling by the courts
but not a predicti on of what will happen, for as shown earlier in this
paper, in the Thornhill cas e, what s eems most probable for the courts

to do one day is not what will happen the next.

'!bus, until the courts

do rule on this case the problems brought forth remain unsolved.

CHA PTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to show how, throughout hi s tory, labor
ha s gained power; and how management has lo s t prerogatives in its
dealing with labor.

The historical review and the review of the basic

statutes of labor law ·put forth the background needed to study two
area s of currant labor controversy.

The firs t was that of plant closure,

the Darlington case wa s used to put forth the ideas of both the National
Labor Relations Board and the federal courts in this area.

After a

review of the case and the controversy, a conclusion was made that
management, in general, has come to the point where it believes that
it is easier to bargain with the union over the closing of a plant and
make whatever concessions are within reason.

By bargaining with the

union, it greatly lessens the chance of committing an unfair labor
practice.

Thus, it can be concluded that management lost its pre-

rogatives to close at will, but i t must be remembered that this only
applie s in multi-plant companies.

Single plant companies can close

at will. for any reason because a s the Court stated closing a total
business ends the employer-employee relationships; thereby, making it
impossible to perpetuate an unfair labor

pr~ctice,

The second area of current controversy was that caused by the
NLRB condemning the approach to labor-relations used by the General
Electric Company.

This approach is commonly called Boulwarism.

An

attempt was made to show that the decision of the Board is bard to
defend in the areas that deal with section 8(c) (free speech) and
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sec tion 8(d ) ( proposal s and concess ions) and that there i s a reasonable
probability that the court will not uphold the Board in these areas ,
but t his remains to be seen.

IT the Courts uphold the Board, then

management's prerogatives would suffer a great blow,
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